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Islam: A New Challenge to the Security of the Western World?

Preliminary remark: Concepts and Paradigms

For the people of this cultural sphere the Islamic Religion has without a doubt in the last two decades become reinforced to a point of crystallization regarding its cultural and to a certain extent also its political self-conception. This goes necessarily hand in hand with a return to the sources of religion and the analysis of those sources. However the labeling of this process as “Fundamentalism” appears problematic. This popular term should of course not be employed here, and indeed for the following reasons: first of all it is limited to the English- and German-speaking worlds; in the French-speaking world (as is the case for the purist-dogmatic tendencies in Catholicism) the term “Integrism” is used instead. Secondly we are dealing with a term coined in the West, which refers to ultra-conservative, “Bible-bound” protestant movements in the United States at the turn of the 19th to the 20th century, and which is therefore already ideologically engaged and very difficult to apply to the Islamic world. Finally both terms are taken from Western linguistic usage; they are applied wholesale in very different ideological currents in the contemporary Islamic world and—this seems to me to be an especially important point—the term has a pejorative connotation for Moslems.¹

The uncontestable facts of an observable re-Islamization in many Muslim societies, directly coinciding perhaps not accidentally with the

1 See A. Hartmann, “Der islamische ‘Fundamentalismus’. Wahrnehmung und Realität einer neuen Entwicklung im Islam,” in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Beilage zur Wochenzeitung *Das Parlament*, B 28/97, 04. Juli 1997, S. 3-13. However, one should mention that some Islamic groupings in Egypt as a kind of move back from the Western term “fundamentalism” call themselves “al-ussuliyun” (those who go back to the roots) (from the Arabic *ussul*—meaning root).

end of the East-West conflict, was elevated to an explanatory model for future world conflicts, which reached its popularized climax in the works of the American political scientist Samuel P. Huntington.² It is probably rare that a social science paradigm has found such publicity and acceptance as Huntington's coarse visions did, which were not only received the highest consideration in all of the chancelleries and advisory committees of Western governments, but which also played a central part in the debates around the forms of societal coexistence with Muslim or Muslim-rooted minorities in Europe. If the level of attention, which Huntington's model received in the West, is also attributable to a specific economic situation of international relationships—the theory supported here—then the reception of his model is also surely traceable to the extreme simplification of highly complex interrelations, which the author is consciously pursuing.

“It is necessary to have a simple paradigm which one can reflect upon the world with. [...] If we refuse to recognize the necessity of simple maps, we will become prisoners of prejudices that we did not realize that we had.”³

Such an appeal for simplification from a social scientist, one might even say a trivialization of highly complex interrelations seems, to put it mildly, shocking.

1. The End of the East-West Conflict and the Revival of the Enemy Image of Islam

First of all one may not overlook the fact that during the East-West conflict within the West as well as and especially in Islamic countries Religion was exploited as an important ideological counter force against “atheistic Communism”. This occurred in the West through consistent references to the Western-Christian Tradition, understood as a counter

2 See S. P. Huntington, *Kampf der Kulturen. Die Neugestaltung der Weltpolitik im 21. Jahrhundert*, München/Wien 1996, as well as the two pioneering essays: “the Clash of Civilizations?” in: *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993, pp. 22-49; and: “The West unique, not universal,” in: *Foreign Affairs*, Nov/Dec. 1996, pp. 28-46.

3 Interview with S. P. Huntington, in: *Newsweek*, Nov. 21, 1994.

force against socialist materialism. This was even more the case in the Islamic world, where Islam and Islamic movements were strengthened and supported as a counter force either against the Soviet Union or as internal political counter movements against regimes that maintained good relations with the Soviet Union and which were pushing their own societal reforms oriented more or less around socialist models, as was for example the case with Nasser's Egypt. This is the only way that one can explain the massive support of the United States (and especially Saudi Arabia) for the Muslim Brothers in the Middle East, the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front as well as for the Islamic guerillas fighting against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. It is one of the small ironies of world history that the members of this former, one is tempted to say, "international Islamic Brigade" are now, as highly qualified professional terrorists, made responsible for terrorist attacks in many Islamic nations—from Bosnia to Algeria and even in Saudi-Arabia.

These secondary effects of condemnations in international politics are however, hardly considered in the media. Sweeping clichés seem to be more manageable here. An initial interpretation of an international conflict, which raised "Islam" to a symbol of the enemy, followed the Iranian Revolution and the hostage-taking of US American diplomats in Teheran. However, it was initially limited to the Shiites and to the almost hostile relationships between Washington and Teheran.⁴ However, the new dichotomization of the worldview occurred, and this appears by no means to be accidental, in the moment of the crisis surrounding Kuwait and the ensuing second Gulf-War, which coincided with the departure of the Soviet Union from world history and which prevented it from being in a position to hinder the Anti-Iraq Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council.⁵ Reinhard Schulze fittingly characterized the arising world situation long before Huntington's essay fully concurring with this theory was published:

4 In this context it does not appear unimportant that the popular revolution in Iran and the vanishing of the Shah made the realization of national goals possible, which had already been attempted by the (leftist) Iranian Prime Minister at the time Mossadeq at the beginning of the 1950s.

5 See also W. Ruf, *Die neue Welt-UN-Ordnung. Vom Umgang des Sicherheitsrates mit der Souveränität der Dritten Welt*, Münster 1994, especially pp. 66-121.

“Consequently the collapse of the East-West-System 1989/1990 signaled a deep cleft in self-definition. If the ‘other’ were to now be absent as a surface of projection for the actual antithesis in one’s own society, then a deficiency would loom, if not a void when describing what constitutes ‘us’. The Kuwait-War, which had been conducted propagandistically since the end of August 1990, was able to fill this void within a very short time. The East became the Orient, Communism became Islam, Stalin became Saddam Hussein. The antithetic, which is characteristic of the West, had an even more radical effect. [...] Islam was determined to be the principle of the Orient, the foundation of the irrational, anti-enlightenment fundamentalism, a universal, which is not only an ideology but which also globally seeks to dominate society, culture, nation and politics. From now on Islam will not only be understood as an ideological antithesis but rather as a complete cultural antithesis to the West and its absolute identity. In this way Islam gets caught up in the founding of the Anti-West, the Anti-Modern, and even the Anti-civilization.”⁶

Here we cannot elaborate on the socio-psychological mechanisms and instruments, which are obviously essential in producing collective identity, which requires the ‘other’ in its definition of “negative” (counter-images).⁷ How quickly, almost imperceptibly this change in enemy images occurred from the disappearance of communism to the new enemy image of Islam is shown for example in the dubious formulations in the French defense white paper from 1994, where it is ascertained that:

“Islamic extremism presents without question the most disturbing threat. [...] It often takes the place that communism held as resistance form against the Western world.”⁸

The NATO General Secretary at the time, Willi Claes put it similarly when he ascertained that Islamic fundamentalism possibly presented a greater threat than did Communism.⁹ There are essentially two reasons, that a rapid re-birth of this sort of the enemy image of Islam is possible:

1. The latency of a long existing enemy image, which has more or less grown up around Islam;

6 R. Schulze, “Vom Antikommunismus zum Antiislamismus. Der Kuwait-Krieg als Fortschreibung des Ost-West-Konflikts“, in: *Peripherie* Nr. 41/1991, pp. 5-12, here p. 7.

7 K. F. Geiger: “Deutsch-europäische Festungsgeschichten und die (Re)-Konstruktion des Feindes Islam,” in: A. Foitzik u.a. (eds.), *Ein Herrenvolk von Untertanen*, Duisburg 1992, pp. 163-184.

8 Republique Francaise, *Livre blanc sur la Defense*, Paris 1994, p. 18.

9 Interview with the British newspaper *The Independent* from February 8, 1995.

2. The processes accompanying globalization in whose wake not only the governmental scope of action shrinks, but also through the transnationalization of the economy and through processes of migration and multi-cultural ways of life as well as socially challenges arise (by no means only in Europe!). These challenges for handed down identity related representations of (national) collectives can also be interpreted and perceived as security risks.

Firstly: The crusades were exploited in the East as well as in the West¹⁰ for the purpose of giving meaning to the historical-literary figure of identity and the “Eastern” was transformed in the “West” into an enemy image, that lasted from the crusades to the anti-Jewish and anti-Turkish tirades of Martin Luther up until the conflicts with the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century, when colonialism and imperialism were safeguarding their technical, economical, and military superiority and through this also culturally and ideologically were able to declare the “others,” namely the Orientals to be culturally, even racially inferior beings.¹¹ Corresponding to the racist clichés of the out-going 19th Century, the superiority of the West was now maintained and substantiated genetically and culturally; just as for example when Ernest Renan the “father” of Orientalism confirmed the eastern inability for scientific and artistic achievements because of

“[...] the terrible simplicity of the Semitic mind, which makes every refined feeling, every rational searching inaccessible to human reason, only to object to it with the ever same tautology ‘God is God’.”¹²

In this way the East is on the one hand degraded to the realm of sub-humans and on the other however, it is the focal point for the sensuality and pleasures, which have no place in the strict moral code of Christianity. These two features have in common that the East can be built up as the opposite of reason, freedom and change. As Aziz el Azmeh accurately puts it:

10 See N. Berman, *Orientalismus, Kolonialismus und Moderne*, Stuttgart 1996.

11 See E. Said, *Orientalism, Western Conceptions of the Orient*, London 1978.

12 E. Renan, “De la part des peuples semitiques,” in: *Œuvres complètes*, vol. 2, Paris 1948, p. 333; quoted after A. Hourani, *Der Islam im europäischen Denken*, Frankfurt/Main 1994, p. 45.

“Enthusiastic irrationality corresponded to reason, politically translated as fanaticism, one of the main goals of the scholars and colonialists of the 19th Century like the modern day television commentator. This idea supplies a reason for the political and social antagonism toward colonial and post-colonial rule, in which political and social movements are reduced to causes, which humans have in common with animals. [...] Civil society, the locus upon which individual needs are rationally coordinated, and which is created by the state, is unthinkable. [...] Islam, as anomaly [...] is looked upon as an anachronism, its characteristics—despotism, ir-rationality, faith, stagnation, medievalism—belong to stages in history, whose inferiority contains a temporal dimension. [...] In this way decline does not become a fact of historical processes rather, a predictable event of the metaphysical order.”¹³

It is exactly this image of genetically-culturally determined inability, which is again taken up by Samuel Huntington, when he in his burning appeal “The West unique, not universal”¹⁴ attempts to explain emphatically, that values like human rights and democracy or characteristics like rationality are exclusively specific to the West and therefore could not possibly be universal, from which he then arrives at the conclusion, that the West must finally stop trying to expand these potential principles, which exist solely within its cultural sphere, onto other cultural realms—an undertaking which is in any case by virtue of its uniqueness futile.

At this point we come full circle as the resurrection of old and in different historical periods diversely interpreted identity differences are revitalized and are utilized for modern practical politics. For example, when Huntington at the end of his essay *The Clash of Civilizations*, sends an urgent reminder about the expansion of the military superiority of the West over other cultural spheres, or when—out of relative intellectual feebleness—the German military chief of staff at the time, Helge Hansen, attempts to clothe Huntington’s cultural outpourings in military-political paradigms:

“Up to now deterrents were determined by rational Western logic, even if ideologically formed in the East. With the end of the East-West conflict and the departure of a world- and ordering power this has changed. The starting point for present conflicts is not an existing sense of risk, it is irrationality and an almost limitless preparedness to take risks. Deterrence in its classical form can and will therefore simply no longer function, at least not, in deterring the deployment of conventional weapons. [...] Security then does not only mean

13 A. El Azmeh, *Islams and Modernities*, London 1993, p. 130f.

14 Thus the title of his essay in *Foreign Affairs*, Nov/Dec. 1996, pp. 28-46.

territorial integrity and the protection from direct military attacks, rather it entails—taken further - the maintenance of our value system and of political, economic or social systems.”¹⁵

Secondly: As we can see from the previously introduced quotes, the Western “us”-perspective of the Eastern-Islamic “other” distinguishes itself through a set of concepts. This set of concepts, stemming from racist paradigms of the 19th century, mix old representations of irrationality and the unpredictability which results from it with new conceived threats, which now no longer appear in the classical form of military threats. That is that they no longer can be thought of as conflicts between territorially constituted nation-states, but that they also entail “the preservation of our value system and of political, economic or social systems”. This expansion of the concept of security to include what is in military terminology continually evoked as the so-called “new risks” is equally the result of the end of bipolarity, if indeed the East-West conflict was the temporary last ideological and territorially definable conflict of systems. It was through this that the Western (and Eastern) military build-ups as well as the existence of armies and military treaties were justified.

With the implosion of the Soviet Union and the break-up of the Warsaw pact the West lost not only an enemy and an enemy image, but also the basis of legitimization for their own military build-up. At the same time challenges of a transnational nature became more and more visible, appearing in the most diverse areas of politics and which could no longer be regulated by nation-state politics. This holds true for the internationalization and deregulation of the economy and finance markets as well as for job markets, economic threats and also for the internationalization of criminality or for terrorism. These threats, transformed in military language into “new risks,” are also partially

15 H. Hansen, “Das deutsche Heer auf dem Weg in die Zukunft“, Rede vor der Gesellschaft für Wehr- und Sicherheitspolitik. Koblenz April 15, 1993; in: *Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung: Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik*, Nr. 5/1993, pp. 34f.

employed to legitimize military build-up,¹⁶ and partially also used for the internal political discussion to cultivate the above discussed enemy image. How population growth and migration—which was strategically introduced in Europe in the 1960s—are built up into one such “new risk,” is demonstrated by the chairman of the foreign relations committee of the German Bundestag, the CDU delegate from Aachen Hans Stercken:

“No one can give a conclusive answer to the question, what kind of effect will the rising overpopulation of this world currently have on the stability within and between the continents. What is the effect of the population explosion in North Africa and the new hedschra,¹⁷ which has already set millions of people in motion from their homes to Italy, Spain and France. [...] Do we perhaps believe, that the population explosion in this part of the world, as well as in Asia and Latin America, can be brought under control by the present extent of developmental aid? And what then are the consequences [...]? Here the idea seems to suggest itself—pick up development and progress at home first.”¹⁸

It is clear in this example, that the problem with identity search and discovery is no longer congruent with national-territorial state constituted spheres, rather that it is increasingly turning into a transnational and thus at the same time into an internal societal phenomenon. To what extent these processes will lead to conflict or perhaps contribute to the positive development of pluralistic and multicultural societies, including the tolerance that goes along with them, cannot be discussed here. They are certainly relevant to general economic and social development, but also to short term political interests, as for example the latest election campaigns in Germany have shown and especially in those connected within the election in Hesse through the CDU conducted “referendum”. They are by no means the result of a (genetic)-cultural determinism, as

16 This becomes especially clear in: Bundesminister der Verteidigung: *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien für den Geschäftsbereich des Bundesministers der Verteidigung*, Bonn, 26. November 1992.

17 The hedschra was the flight of the prophet from Mecca to Medina. It is also the beginning of the Islamic calendar.

18 H. Stercken: “Die Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik des souverän gewordenen Deutschland,” in: *Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik* Nr. 9/1991, pp. 16-18.

it appears for example in the flood of literature about “Muslims in Germany” or “Muslims in Europe”.¹⁹

2. Re-Islamization as political process

However, the orientalist discourse on the inferiority of Muslims was not only ideology, it also had hard material components: Thus it was utilized in discrimination and in the exclusion above all from the education system, which often hindered the colonized from attaining access to free professions and higher offices in government. This manipulation of religion for the purposes of discrimination against Muslims was especially blatant in Algeria, where the colonized did have French citizenship with all of its responsibilities but were nevertheless excluded from the observance of their civil rights, by having a special “Muslim legal status”.²⁰ Discrimination by means of religious confession brought about the identification of Muslims with something special, that separated them from the Europeans—namely religion. The Islamic Reform movement (which today would probably be called Fundamentalism) under the spiritual leadership of Jamal Eddine al Afghani and Mohamed Abduh is already to be understood as just such an identity generating counter reaction. Thus regarding this movement, the Salafiya, Peters ascertains:

“In this way Islam became for Muslims something that represents in their consciousness predominantly—and for many exclusively—an essential element of their cultural identity, which must be defended against external arguments, and which is not as much a form of divine belief or of the discovery of the goal and meaning of life and an ideal social order. In order to

19 Not even the much respected empirical study of W. Heitmeyer is completely free of it: *Verlockender Fundamentalismus*, Frankfurt a.M. 1997. See also the literature cited there.

20 See W. Ruf, *Die algerische Tragödie. Vom Zerschlagen des Staates einer zerrissenen Gesellschaft*, Münster 1997, especially pp. 20-24.

fulfill this new goal Islam had to become something, which one could be proud of.”²¹

As an identity related political movement aimed against colonialism Islamic concepts were mixed with nationalistic ideas. In an almost paradigmatic way this holds true for the identity formula of Algerian nationalism: “Islam is my religion, Arabic my language, Algeria my home land,” and in many other Arabic countries as well religious ideas of identity have been combined with nationalistic claims. Thus it is no accident, that—excluding multi-confessional Lebanon and the “Ataturk” reformed Turkey of Mustapha Kemal—Islam is the state religion of all Middle Eastern nations. And even during the strongest phase of secularist Arabic nationalism, those persecuted were justified by means of socialistic models oriented around development strategies with the egalitarian demands of the Koran. The only exception was the Baath-Party, while in Morocco there was for a time talk of “royal socialism”. Neither the theoretical modernization concepts oriented around capitalistic models nor the socialistic concepts, which appeal to developmental strategies brought the desired economic success. To the contrary both intensified the social contrasts within Islamic countries. In addition, this failure in the case of the rather socialistic oriented countries, occurred for the most part at the same time as the collapse of the Soviet Union and the break up of the “socialist camp”. The increase in social injustice and the intensification of antagonisms within societies could so easily be interpreted as the result of these developmental models, which—whether “capitalistic” or “socialistic”—were both imported from the West and which had one thing in common: the atheism, which, from the Islamic perspective, represented the basis of the Western Systems. And on the surface it was not difficult to brand the ruling elite as henchmen of the West; they themselves even profited from the development of underdevelopment, as they appropriated sinecure and privilege as state bureaucracy, while the vast masses

21 R. Peters: “Erneuerungsbewegungen im Islam vom 18. bis zum 20. Jahrhundert und die Rolle des Islams in der neueren Geschichte: Antikolonialismus und Nationalismus,” in: W. Ende/U. Steinbach (eds.), *Der Islam in der Gegenwart*, 2. ed. 1989, pp. 91-131, here p. 109.

became increasingly impoverished. Thus it is surely accurate to characterize the socio-economic development in these countries as a process, which divided its societies into a thin layer of modernization-winners and into a broad mass of modernization-loser.²²

The Iranian Revolution also had without doubt a catalyzing effect upon the Islamic movements in the Sunnitic countries. It even demonstrated that a popular revolution could topple a hated regime, just as the new ordering of a society could be based on Islamic principles. Only with the background of growing social unrest and the search for self-identity did it become a political signal, which strengthened the growth of the movements in the individual nations and allowed certain groupings to resort to violent measures.

With this in mind, however, it is absurd to envision the revolt in Islamic countries and the social movements built on Islamic principles as a unified whole, as Huntington's "clash of the cultures"-model would suggest. The respective national historical characters are too diverse, the respective interests of individual groupings too differentiated, and—consequently—the respective interpretations of Islamic traditions for present political objectives as well. Because for Islamic movements it is less important to produce some "theocratic" political system than to achieve political power and to vanquish the authoritarian and dictatorial regimes, which have for years held police-like control of Eastern societies and which have used political domination for their own private benefit and which have lost all legitimacy.²³ An Irony of this macro-political development is that it is exactly these regimes that have in an attempt to regain at least a part of their legitimacy, themselves pushed forth an Islamization of society (prohibition, removal of women's rights, etc.). As a result they have supported Islam but they themselves have failed to regain their lost legitimacy in the eyes of their people.

22 See : Graham E. Fuller, "The clash of ideas, the next ideology," in: *Foreign Policy* 89, Spring 1995, pp. 145-158; as well as I. A. Karawan: "The islamist impass," *Adelphi Paper* 314, Oxford University Press 1997.

23 See W. Ruf, "Demokratie in der arabischen Welt—Ein Widerspruch in sich selbst?," in: *Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit*, Heft 9/1998, pp. 228-231.

Therefore it is ascertainable that Islamic movements have their roots in the masses of the impoverished and marginalized who have had enough of the promises of rulers, who claim to want to put an end to the lack of prospects, unemployment and misery. The decade old promises of budding social advancement, which were again and again rhetorically conveyed with references to Islam and its social principles, fell flat in the face of the life style of those who preached them. While the governments of the Arab world—its rulers serving by far for the longest time in the world—have increasingly lost their legitimacy, the Islamic movements could present themselves as the heirs and preservers of the old nationalistic, anti-imperialistic, and therefore: of anti-West discourses; and it is not difficult for them to provide superficial proof, that their rulers are in effect only acting in the interests of the hated West and that they are profiting at the expense of the population and the national economy. In addition there is the unconditional support of the West and above all of its predominant power, the United States, for Israel, which is perceived as an imperialistic implant, whose permanent violations against elementary principles of human rights were never sanctioned unlike for example the attempted Iraqi annexation of Kuwait.

And it is here that Western foreign policy is caught in a dilemma: While on the one hand the establishment of democratic structures and the respect for human rights are verbally demanded, it appears that the West in reality is more concerned with the preservation of stability, which amounts to the support of present authoritarian and repressive systems.²⁴ The almost blind support of current regimes, that one claims to be able to deal with, leads to a situation where every political opposition is made mute, where the governments in Maghreb and in the Middle East referring to the “terrorism” of small individual Islamic groups are able to present themselves as a forefront of Western security policy against the so-called Islamic threat and these governments use real or imagined Islamic threats to receive Western aide. But is not the

24 See P. Schlotter, “Euro-mediterrane ‘Partnerschaft’ und Demokratisierung. Zur Maghrebpolitik der Europäischen Union,” in: *Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit*, Heft 9/1998, pp. 235-237; also: V. Perthes, “Eher pluralistisch als demokratisch. Zum Stand der Demokratie in der arabischen Welt,” *op.cit.*, pp. 232-234.

revolt of the Islamists, their wish take-part in power and to be involved in the guiding and developing societies a fundamental democratic demand? And aren't concepts like "terrorism" in the end relative and (not) easily subject to misuse as the criminalization of political enemies?: Thus in authoritarian regimes opposition groups can also be criminalized, exactly because they are pursuing democratic goals."²⁵

Furthermore: In directly confronting all more or less Islamic movements does the West not confirm the old cliché and prejudice, according to which the West is only concerned with the already centuries old struggle against the peoples of this region, their culture and religion? It is obvious that through such confrontational policies only the radical forces are supported, because the moderates do not receive a chance for political mediation within the uncompromising nature of both sides.

Accurate in Samuel Huntington's analysis is definitely the initial hypothesis that at the turn of the century nations are no longer the sole and exclusive protagonists of the international system. This is the unavoidable result of globalization. However it is incorrect to evoke cultures as the (sole) new protagonists of political actions and to characterize this as more or less placid, while Islam is acknowledged as especially aggressive: "Islam has bloody borders."²⁶ Identities are only made by means of such controversial models, along with conflicts. A policy, which is based upon this kind of confrontational thought, not only produces resistance, but it also supports the justification of Islamic violence and in the end backs up the most radical elements, only to justify militarily repressive "anti-terrorist" responses, whether they are in agreement with human rights or not, as for example the latest attacks of the United States against Sudan and Afghanistan after the terrorist attacks on the US embassy in Nairobi and Daresslam.

The thinking behind the clash of civilisations model runs the danger of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy; a vicious circle, in which not only conflict but also terror and counter-terror are reciprocally determined and in the end justified. If it should really be true as Sam

25 A. Jünemann, "Die Mittelmeerpolitik der Europäischen Union," in: *Frankreich Jahrbuch 1997*, pp. 93-115, here p. 102.

26 S. P. Huntington, "The Clash of civilizations?," *op.cit.*, p. 35.

Huntington says, that rationality is one of the essential characteristics of the West, then it is high time, that exactly this West, its political advisers and its political protagonists rationally pursue the social and economical as well as cultural processes in Islamic countries; rationally analyze and rationally develop strategies according to long term policies oriented around peace, democracy and balance. Such policies imply necessarily the acceptance of political forces, which in the eyes of large portions of the population of the Islamic world are recognized as their legitimate representatives. And such an acceptance as legitimate political protagonists and as discussion partners will lead the Islamic movements away from criminalization and will force them into the realm of legal political activity—when then one day a minimum of pluralism and democracy will be possible, which the West has appealed for again and again. The support of such a development would be constructive security policy for East as well as West.